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Abstract
There is an extensive literature claiming that it is often difﬁcult to make use of arbitrage opportunities in
ﬁnancialmarkets.Thispaperprovidesanewreasonwhyexistingarbitrageopportunitiesmightnotbeseized.
We consider a world with short-lived securities, no short-selling constraints and no transaction costs. We
show that to exploit all existing arbitrage opportunities, traders should pay attention to all ﬁnancial markets
simultaneously. The paper gives a general result stating that failure to do so will leave some arbitrage
opportunities unexploited with probability one.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
One of the fundamental concepts in ﬁnance is arbitrage, deﬁned as the simultaneous purchase
and sale of the same, or essentially similar, security in two different markets for advantageously
different prices, see Sharpe and Alexander (1990). The efﬁcient market hypothesis relies
to a large extent on the assumption that, whenever present, arbitrage opportunities will be
exploited quickly. The behavioral ﬁnance literature as in Shleifer (2000, p. 2), questions this
hypothesis:
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The key forces by which markets are supposed to attain efﬁciency, such as arbitrage, are
likelytobemuchweakerandmorelimitedthantheefﬁcientmarketstheoristshavesupposed.
In reality arbitrage opportunities are limited by a number of factors like the existence of
transactions costs, short-selling contraints, or mispricing of securities deepening in the short
run.
This paper claims that even under close to ideal circumstances, i.e. the case where transactions
costsarezero,short-sellingconstraintsdonotexistandsecuritiesareshort-lived(sothatdeepening
of mispricing is impossible), existing arbitrage opportunities might not be seized. We show that
thisisgenerallythecasewhenevertradersrestricttheirattentiontoasubsetofthesecuritiestraded
at a certain point in time.
Following Radner and Rothschild (1975), many authors have observed that attention is only
available in limited amounts. Van Zandt (1999) argues that individuals are bounded not so much
bythetotalamountofinformationprocessingtheycanhandle,asbytheamounttheycanperform
in a given amount of time. This leads to parallel or distributed processing, where information
processingtasksarebrokendownintostepsthataresharedamongthemembersoftheorganization
and where each of these steps takes time.
Limits to the capability of information processing are the main reasons for traders do spe-
cialize to subsets of securities. In investment ﬁrms, for instance, analysts typically concentrate
on the stocks within a particular industry sector. In Vayanos (2003), this feature is modeled by
a processing constraint. Agents are assumed to analyze portfolios of at most a ﬁxed number of
inputs, where an input can either be an asset examined directly, or a subordinate’s portfolio.
In this paper we incorporate information processing constraints in the ﬁnance version of the
general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets. The model is a special case of the
restrictedmarketparticipationmodelsofSiconolﬁ(1988)andPolemarchakisandSiconolﬁ(1997).
Since we assume a two-period time horizon, all traded assets are short-lived. This is the most
favorable case for absence of arbitrage, as it makes deepening of mispricing impossible. Investors
canbuyandsellassetsinperiod0withoutbeingsubjecttoshort-sellingconstraintsortransactions
costs. They are however subject to information processing constraints. An investor is assumed to
be unable to be active in the markets of all traded assets simultaneously.
Assets have payoffs in period 1, depending on the realization of the state of nature. Asset
payoffs are real, i.e. denominated in terms of the consumption good. Investors consume in both
periods. In this context, the usual deﬁnition of no-arbitrage is both the absence of a costless
portfolio with non-negative returns in each future state of nature and strictly positive returns in
at least one state, and of a portfolio yielding income in period 0 and with non-negative returns in
each future state of nature.
Since investors restrict their attention to certain subsets of assets, they might not be able to
make use of certain arbitrage opportunities. One might expect, however, that, under suitable
assumptions,theyareabletodosocollectively.Inparticular,onemightexpectthatthisisthecase
as long as the subsets of assets to which investors pay attention overlap. This paper makes the
pointthatthisintuitioniswrong.Foralmostallassetstructures,assoonaseachinvestorislimited
in his trading opportunities to some extent, some arbitrage opportunities will be left unexploited,
even at the collective level.
A related work in the literature is the one of Basak and Croitoru (2000), who also study
the violation of no-arbitrage conditions. They consider an inﬁnite horizon framework with three
assets,abond,astockandaderivative.Theyputshort-salesconstraintsonassetsandupperbounds
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individuals altogether, but do not impose any transaction costs, and in particular no short-sales
constraints, on assets individuals can trade in.
Section 2 outlines our model and derives the appropriate no-arbitrage conditions. Section 3
shows a ﬁrst example that the no-arbitrage conditions in a restricted market participation model
maydifferfromtheusualno-arbitrageconditions.Section4derivesthemainresult:thisistypically
the case, no matter how small the restriction in market participation.
2. Arbitrage
Weconsiderthecasethatismostfavorabletoarbitrage.Inparticular,weconsideramodelwith
two time periods, t=0, 1, and one state of nature s out of S possible states of nature realizing at
t=1. At each time period, in each state of nature, there is a single good available, called income.
Thereisaﬁnitenumberofinvestorsi=1,...,I.Att=0investorsallocatetheirmoneybetween
consumption and investment in one of the available assets j=1,..., J. Throughout we restrict
attention to the case J≤S. The symbols I, J, and S denote the sets {1, ..., I}, {1, ..., J}, and
{1, ..., S}, respectively.
Assets payoff in period 1. The payoff of asset j in state s is given by A
j
s. Investor i has a utility
function Ui and an initial income stream ωi ∈RS+1
+ . The set of possible income streams is given
by Xi = RS+1
+ .
Investor i has only access to a limited set of asset markets. Cognitive restrictions require him
to restrict attention to the set Ji ⊂ J of assets. In reality, investors do indeed concentrate on a
limited set of assets. The literature on information processing constraints explains why this is so.
Let q∈RJ denote the asset prices and θi ∈RJ the net asset portfolio of agent i, i.e. nega-
tive components of θi denote sales of the corresponding assets and positive components denote
purchases.












j = 0,j ∈J\Ji
Investor i has arbitrage opportunities if he can purchase a portfolio at no cost today, with non-
negative payoffs at each state s and a strictly positive payoff in at least one state, or if he can
purchase a portfolio yielding positive income in period 0 and non-negative payoffs at each future
state. For investor i this leads to the following no-arbitrage condition, which is labelled NACi:
(NACi)there is noθi ∈RJ such thatθi
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Asset prices are said to satisfy the no-arbitrage condition NAC if the no-arbitrage condition is
satisﬁed for all investors. So asset prices q satisfy NAC if and only if NACi is satisﬁed for every
i∈I. This is easily seen to be equivalent to the statement that q∈∩ i∈IQi.
3. Networks of agents
Anotherinterestingno-arbitrageconditionistheonewhichfollowsifsomeomniscientinvestor
could oversee all the possibilities offered in the market. This leads to the market no-arbitrage
condition NACm:
















The following proposition is easily shown.
Proposition 3.1. It holds that Qm ⊂∩ i∈IQi.
Proposition 3.1 states that NACm implies NAC. Of course, if some agent can trade in all
markets, then the concepts of NAC and NACm coincide.
Proposition 3.2. If for some investor i∈I it holds that Ji = J, then Qm =∩ i∈IQi.
Investor i in the proposition is omniscient, so the result follows trivially.
A ﬁrst intuition would be that if the Ji overlap, then NAC implies NACm. The market of asset
j  is said to be related to the market of asset j   if for some agent i∈I it holds that j , j   ∈Ji. The
market of asset j  is said to be indirectly related to the market of asset j   if there is a sequence of
markets j1, ..., jn such that j1 =j  and jn =j   and jk and jk+1 are directly related for all k∈{1, ...,
n−1}.
Neitherdirectrelatednessnorindirectrelatednessofallmarketsissufﬁcientforthesets∩i∈IQi
and Qm to coincide. In fact, consider the following example where it holds that all markets are
directly related. Notice that one needs at least three assets for an interesting example.











Assumethatinvestori∈Icannottradeinasseti.So,J1 ={ 2,3},J2 ={ 1,3}andJ3 ={ 1,2}.
Consider the asset price system q=(5, 3, 5). We claim that q / ∈Qm. Indeed, θ =(−1, +3, −1) is
an arbitrage portfolio. However, q belongs to ∩i∈IQi because for J1 ={ 2,3}, π=(1/2, 1/6,
13/6), for J2 ={ 1,3}, π=(1, 2, 1) and for J3 ={ 1,2}, π=(13/6, 1/6, 1/2) are state price vectors
demonstrating the absence of arbitrage opportunities.560 T. Hens et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 42 (2006) 556–564
Theexampleisthestrongestexamplepossibleinthesensethataddingonemarkettooneagent
gives equivalence between NAC and NACm by Proposition 3.2.
4. Limits to arbitrage
ThissectionshowsthatExample3.1isnotanexceptionalcase.Itmakesthestrikingobservation
that in ﬁnance economies with restricted market participation, forgone arbitrage opportunities are
the rule rather than the exception.
Let A denote the set of (S×J)-dimensional matrices. Let A+ be the set of those matrices in
A for which there is a non-trivial asset portfolio giving non-negative returns in each state:
A+ ={ A∈A|there existsθ ∈RJ\{0}such thatAθ ∈RS
+}
We will restrict attention to the set of asset return matrices A+. Asset return matrices outside
A+ are hardly interesting: as is demonstrated in the next proposition, if the asset return matrix
lies outside A+, then the conditions NACi and NACm do not impose any restrictions on the asset
prices.
Proposition 4.1. Let A∈A. If A is not in A+, then Qi = RJ for all i∈I and Qm = RJ.
Conversely, if Qm = RJ, then A is not in A+.
Proof. The ﬁrst part of the proposition is obvious: if A is not in A+, then there is no non-
zero portfolio of assets that gives a non-negative return in each state. Thus, by the deﬁnition of
no-arbitrage, any price vector q trivially satisﬁes conditions NACi and NACm.
To prove the converse, suppose there exists a price vector q∈RJ\Qm. Then, {λq|λ>0}∩
{πA|π∈RS
++} is an empty set. By the separating hyperplane theorem, there exists θ ∈RJ\{0}
such that λqθ ≤πAθ for all λ>0 and π∈RS
++. Taking the limit for λ↓0, we obtain 0≤πAθ
for all π∈RS
++. For every σ ∈S, taking the limit πσ →1 and πs ↓0, s∈S\{σ}, we get 0≤Aσθ.
Hence, Aθ ∈RS
+,s oA∈A+. 
The next theorem is the main result of the paper. It claims that for a generic matrix in A+ there
is at least one price vector that satisﬁes the condition NACi for all i but violates the condition
NACm.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that for all investors i∈I it holds that Ji  = J. Then there exists an open
subset A∗
+ of the set A+ with A+\A∗
+ having Lebesgue measure zero such that Qm  =∩ i∈IQi
for all A∈A∗
+.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 consists of two steps. Step one provides a necessary and sufﬁcient
condition for the coincidence of the sets Qm and ∩i∈IQi in terms of so-called “fundamental
portfolios”. Convex analysis is employed as the main tool in the ﬁrst step of the proof. As a
second step, we use the Transversality Theorem to demonstrate that this condition imposes too
many restrictions on the asset return matrix.
Let C be a closed convex cone. A half-line L emanating from the origin is called an extreme
ray of C if L⊆C and every closed line segment in C with a relative interior point in L has both
endpointsinL.LetKbeanarbitrarysubsetofRJ.Then,theconvexconegeneratedbyKisasubset
of RJ containing zero and all those vectors which can be represented as a linear combination with
positiveweightsofﬁnitelymanypointsinK.Theconvexconegeneratedbytheemptysetconsists
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Given a matrix A∈A+, let Θ+ and Θi
+, be closed convex cones deﬁned by
Θ+ ={ θ ∈RJ|Aθ ∈RS
+},Θ i
+ ={ θ ∈Θ+|θj = 0ifj ∈J\Ji}
Thus, the set Θ+ consist of all those portfolios that give a hypothetical omnipresent investor non-
negative payoff in every state. There are portfolios that can potentially violate the no-arbitrage
conditions NACm. The set Θi
+ selects only those portfolios in Θ+ that are feasible to agent i.
These are portfolios that can potentially violate the no-arbitrage conditions NACi.
Let T denote the set of all those vectors θ ∈Θ+ with  θ =1 such that the half-line emanating
from the origin and passing through θ is an extreme ray of the cone Θ+. We refer to the set T as
the set of fundamental portfolios.
Lemma 4.1. Let the matrix A∈A+ have rank J. Then Θ+ is the convex cone generated by T.
The set T is non-empty.
Proof. The fact that the set T generates the cone Θ+ is an immediate implication of Corollary
18.5.2 of Rockafellar (1997). Since A belongs to A+, there is a non-zero vector in Θ+. It follows
that the set T is non-empty, for the convex cone generated by the empty set consists of the zero
vector alone. 
Now consider the following conditions:





(C3) T ⊆∪ i∈IΘi
+.
Theﬁrstofthesesaysthatifnoneoftherestrictedinvestors1,...,Ihasanarbitrageopportunity,




such portfolio can be written as a sum of individual portfolios, where each individual portfolio is
feasible to the respective investor and gives him a non-negative return in every state.
Lemma 4.2. Let A∈A+ have rank J. Then the conditions (C1), (C2), and (C3) are equivalent.





+\{0}. By condition (C1), the inequality 0 <q ¯ θ holds for all q∈∩ i∈IQi. That is, 0 <q ¯ θ






s, for alli∈I,j ∈Ji, 0 <π i
s, for alli∈I,s ∈S (1)






s, for alli∈I,j ∈Ji, 0 ≤ πi
s, for alli∈I,s ∈S (2)
To see this, let (q,π)∈RJ × RSI be such that the conditions in (2) are satisﬁed. Given an
 >0, the pair (q( ), π( )) satisﬁes the conditions in (1), where πi
s(ε) = πi





s. Therefore, 0 <q (ε)¯ θ. Letting  ↓0, we obtain 0 ≤ q¯ θ, as desired.562 T. Hens et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 42 (2006) 556–564
Now, we make use of Farkas’ Lemma, see Rockafellar (1997, Corollary 22.3.1): for all i∈I,
j ∈Ji and s∈S there exist numbers θi
j and µi










j = ¯ θj, for allj ∈J
Deﬁne θi
j to be zero for all i∈I and j ∈J\Ji and let θi = (θi
1,...,θi
j). Then, θi ∈Θi
+ and
 




(C2⇒C1) Given q∈∩ i∈IQi we must show that q∈Qm. Consider θ ∈RJ be such that
Aθ ∈RS
+\{0}. By condition (C2), there exist θi ∈Θi
+ for i∈I such that
 
i∈Iθi = θ. More-
over, there is i0 ∈I with Aθi0 ∈RS
+\{0}.A sq∈Qi for all i∈I, we must have 0 ≤ qθi for all i∈I
and 0 <q θ i0. It follows that 0<qθ. Thus, q∈Qm.




i∈Iθi = θ.A sθ is a non-zero vector, there is i0 ∈I such that θi0 is a non-zero vector.
Observe that the line segment with endpoints 2θi0 and 2
 
i∈I\{i0}θi contains the vector θ in




2θi0 = tθ. This implies that θ is an element of Θi0
+.
(C3⇒C2) By Lemma 4.1, Θ+ is the convex cone generated by T. By condition (C3), it
is contained in the convex cone generated by ∪i∈IΘi
+. Clearly, the convex cone generated by
∪i∈IΘi




For each θ ∈Θ+ with  θ =1, let S(θ) ={ s∈S|Asθ = 0}. Denote by codim (θ) the codimen-
sion of the linear subspace of RJ spanned by the vectors As, s∈S(θ). The codimension of the
linear subspace spanned by the vectors As, s∈S(θ), together with vector θ equals codim (θ)−1.
Moreover, observe that codim (θ)≥1. The next lemma shows that portfolios in T are charac-
terized by the property that codim (θ)=1. The intuition behind this result is that otherwise an
appropriately chosen portfolio could both be added and subtracted from θ without leaving Θ+.
This contradicts θ being a portfolio in T.
Lemma 4.3. Let A∈A+ with rank J and θ ∈Θ+ with  θ =1be given. Then θ ∈T if and only
if codim (θ)=1.
Proof. Let L denote a half-line emanating from the origin and passing through the point
θ.
Suppose that codim (θ)>1. Then, the codimension of the linear space spanned by the vectors
As, s∈S(θ), together with vector θ is non-zero. Hence, there exists a vector ξ ∈RJ\{0} such
that Asξ =0 for all s∈S(θ) and θξ=0.AsAsθ >0 for all s∈S\S(θ), there is an ε>0 such that
As(θ +tξ)>0 for all t∈[−ε, ε] and s∈S\S(θ). Thus, the closed line segment with endpoints
(θ −εξ) and (θ +εξ) lies entirely in Θ+ and contains vector θ in its relative interior. However,
neither of its endpoints belongs to L. Therefore, L is not an extreme ray of Θ+, and θ is not an
element of the set T.
Suppose that codim (θ)=1.Letθ  and θ   be two points in Θ+ such that λθ  +(1−λ)θ   =tθ
for some λ∈(0, 1) and t≥0. We must show that θ  and θ   both belong to L. Indeed, Asθ  ≥0
and Asθ   ≥0 for all s∈S.I fs∈S(θ), then Asθ =0, and therefore Asθ  =Asθ   =0. Thus, all three
vectors θ, θ , and θ   belong to a linear subspace orthogonal to the span of the vectors As, s∈S(θ).
As the dimension of this linear subspace is equal to 1, there are real numbers t  and t   such
that θ  =t θ and θ   =t  θ. If the number t  were negative, θ  would be a non-zero vector such thatT. Hens et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 42 (2006) 556–564 563
Table 1
The elements of the set T




















0≤Aθ  =t Aθ ≤0. This would contradict the assumption that A has rank J. Therefore, t  ≥0, and
therefore θ  ∈L. It follows similarly that θ   ∈L. 
Corollary 4.1. Let A∈A+ with rank J and θ ∈T be given. Then the set S(θ) consists of at least
J−1 distinct elements.
The following example illustrates the set T.
















Observe that A is an element of the set A+ with rank J. Moreover, the matrix A is in general
position: each (3×3)-dimensional submatrix of A is non-singular. The set T consists of the four
elements reported in Table 1.
Elements 1 and 4 of the set T belong to Θ1
+, element 2 belongs to Θ2
+, and element 3 belongs
to Θ3
+. Since T ⊆∪ i∈IΘi
+, it follows by Lemma 4.2 that the sets Qm and ∩i∈IQi coincide.
Lemma 4.4. Suppose that Ji  = J for all i∈I. Then there exists an open subset A  of A with
A\A  having Lebesgue measure zero such that for all A∈A  ∩ A+, T ∩ Θi
+ =∅for all i∈I.
Proof. For every j ∈J and for every subset M of S with cardinality J−1, deﬁne the function











Deﬁne the sets AjM as
AjM ={ A∈A|there is noθ ∈RJ such thatFjM(A,θ) = 0}
To see that AjM is open, let A(n) be the sequence of matrices in A\AjM converging to some
A∈A. Then, there exists a sequence θ(n) in RJ such that FjM(A(n), θ(n))=0 for all n. Since the
sequence θ(n) is bounded, it has a convergent subsequence converging to some θ ∈RJ. Hence,
FjM(A, θ)=0, and the matrix A belongs to the complement of the set AjM.
The partial derivatives of the function FjM with respect to θ and As, s∈M, are represented in
Table2.ForsimplicitywetakeMequalto{1,...,J−1}.Itiseasytoseethatforall(A,θ)∈F−1
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Table 2
Partial derivatives of the function FjM, M={1, ..., J−1}
θ A1 A2 ··· AJ−1
A1θ A1 θ 0 ··· 0







AJ−1θ AJ−1 00··· 0
θ·θ−12 θ 00··· 0
θj e 00··· 0
The symbol e is a J-dimensional row-vector such that el =0 for all l∈J\{j} and ej =1.
the matrix of the partial derivatives has full row rank. That is, FjM is transversal to zero. The
Transversality Theorem implies that the complement of the set AjM has Lebesgue measure zero.
Finally, deﬁne A  as the set of matrices with rank J in the intersection of all sets AjM. Then,
A  is open and its complement has Lebesgue measure zero.
LetA∈A  ∩ A+ andθ ∈T.Supposethatθ ∈Θi
+ forsomei∈I.Then,θj =0foreveryj ∈J\Ji.
Corollary 4.1 implies that there is a subset M of the set S with cardinality J−1 such that Asθ =0
for all s∈M. Therefore, FjM(A, θ)=0 for every j ∈J\Ji, a contradiction to A∈A . Thus, we
have proved that T ∩ Θi
+ =∅for all i∈I and A∈A  ∩ A+. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Deﬁne A∗
+ to be the set of matrices with rank J in the intersection
of the sets A+ and A . As both the set of matrices in A with rank J and the set A  are open
in A, A∗
+ is open in A+. Since both the set of matrices in A with rank J and the set A  have
full Lebesgue measure, the set A+\A∗
+ has Lebesgue measure zero. For all A∈A∗
+ the set T is
non-empty, whereas its intersection with the collection of cones Θi
+ is empty. By Lemma 4.2,
∩i∈IQi  = Qm. 
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